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"We are not the public service of Canada. We are not just another department. We are the Canadian 
Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people."   
-- General Rick Hillier 
  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the catalyst for a long series of events that would 
change the lives of people worldwide for years to follow. Canada now finds itself mired in one of the 
most dangerous regions of Afghanistan, desperately trying to complete its biggest military operation 
since the Korean War. Canada began its mission in Afghanistan in Kandahar Province after the US had 
secured the region. Canadian troops were then sent to the relative safety of the country's capital, Kabul, 
and Canada was set to reduce its role in Afghanistan after one year. However, the decision was made to 
send troops back to Kandahar in an extensive role that would draw Canada deeper into conflict and 
long-term commitments. 
 
This essay will argue that there were three primary motivations behind Canada's decision to remain in 
Afghanistan and move from Kabul back to Kandahar in an extensive combat-developmental role: a 
desire to please the United States, a desire for international prestige and bargaining power, and a desire 
to display and properly support Canada's revolutionized military and defence policy. Of the many 
external and domestic actors that influenced the final decision, special attention will be paid to Rick 
Hillier, the Canadian general described as the "driving intellectual force" (Simpson, 2009, p. 1) and the 
"principal architect... [of] Canada's current mission to Afghanistan" (Stein and Lang, 2008, p.1). 
 
Canada's involvement in Afghanistan can only be considered in connection with Canada's closest ally, 
the US. After the 9/11 attacks, Canada was politically obligated to support the US in its attempt to 
capture those responsible and deter future attacks. NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, 
which states that an attack on one member of NATO is considered an attack on all, and that all members 
are expected to assist the attacked member in collective self-defence. In response to the US request for 
military assistance, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that Canada would provide "certain 
contributions as part of an international military coalition against international terrorism" ("Chretien: 
Canadian Troops," 2001, p.1). This coalition was to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban in 
order to capture Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda terrorists behind the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban 
were militant Islamists then ruling Afghanistan, and they were sheltering bin Laden from international 
prosecution (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.33). 
Canada's initial contribution was limited. Four naval ships sailed to the Arabian Sea and Canada's special 
forces unit—Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2)—was secretly sent to southern Afghanistan with other coalition 
special forces in early December ("Canadian Commandoes," 2001, p.1). Eventually, 750 soldiers 
deployed to Kandahar Province, beginning in January 2002, for six months. Their tour was relatively 
uneventful, as the US had already cleared out most of the Taliban. When the tour ended it seemed that 
Canada's military would be given a "period of operational pause and regeneration" (Stein and Lang, 
2007, p.20). 
 
However, it was expected that the US would soon request a renewed Canadian troop presence in 
Afghanistan in order to free up American troops for the pending invasion of Iraq. Canadian military 
leaders were supportive of another combat mission in Kandahar; former Minister of National Defence 
John McCallum says, "[The military leadership]... liked the idea of us being in combat... They generally 
looked closely to their American peers. Those were the people they wanted to impress" (quoted in Stein 
and Lang, 2007, p.42). 
 
In January 2003, McCallum met with US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld. McCallum had been 
advised by the Canadian ambassador to Washington to reaffirm that "Canada was a secure and reliable 
ally" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.47). Rumsfeld requested that Canada lead the International Security 
Assistance Force, the UN-mandated coalition operating in Afghanistan (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.50). 
McCallum responded by saying that if this option were accepted, Canada would not be able to offer any 
troops to Iraq, as political will and military resources would be directed towards Afghanistan instead. 
 
In what became known as the "Afghanistan Solution" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.73), Canada accepted 
leadership of ISAF. Canada would not support the US in Iraq, but contributing more troops to 
Afghanistan was said to be "a neat political way of squaring the problem... of Canada-US relations" 
(Stein and Lang, 2007, p.63). The main reason for further Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, then, 
was a desire to please the US.  
 
In August 2003, two thousand Canadian troops began deployment to Kabul. Canada was to lead ISAF for 
one year, after which another NATO country would assume responsibility. This was the exit-strategy for 
Canada and the precondition of accepting leadership set by then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Ray 
Henault. Canada's mission was to "help... the Afghan Transitional Authority maintain a safe and secure 
environment in Kabul" while a constitution was developed and ratified ("Operation Athena," 2011, p.1). 
It was not expected to be a very dangerous mission, and Canada would win favour with the US, while 
still ensuring its exit from the war. 
 
A more important part of Canada's exit strategy was a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). PRTs were 
the "core of the post-war nation-building strategy the [US] had developed for Afghanistan" (Stein and 
Lang, 2007, p.98). They consisted of civilian and military personnel working to "encourage peace and 
stability within regions and monitor the supervision of developmental activities," and to strengthen the 
influence of the Afghan government (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.97). They would operate according to the 
"3-D approach," integrating defence, diplomacy and developmental assistance. After establishing 
security and assisting in the rebuilding process, PRTs would allow the US to gradually withdraw from 
Afghanistan by handing the responsibility of long-term reconstruction work over to its allies. Similarly, 
Canadian officials were already planning to replace the 2000 Canadian troops with a 200-person-strong 
PRT at the end of their tour as part of Canada's exit strategy, replacing the large combative mission with 
a smaller, safer reconstructive mission (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.108). 
 
Ironically, the PRT would draw Canada deeper into the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. The origins 
of this may be found in the replacement of Jean Chretien by Paul Martin as Prime Minister in 2003. 
Martin was concerned about how Chretien had left the state of Canada's relationship with the US after 
years of uneasy "business-like relations" (Barry, 2003, p. 120), culminating in Chretien's refusal to 
support the Iraq War. Improving Canada-US relations was a priority for Martin, and this would prove to 
be a significant factor in Canada's increased role in Afghanistan. 
 
Martin also wanted to distinguish his government from Chretien's, which was characterized by 
"managerialism and incrementalism" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.109). Martin planned to present a "bold, 
ambitious agenda" that would "redefine and transform Canada's role in the world" (Stein and Lang, 
2007, p.139). The last major review of Canada's foreign policy had been done by Chretien's government 
ten years earlier. Bill Graham—Martin's new Minister of Foreign Affairs—was charged with coordinating 
all the government departments to produce a dramatic review of Canada's foreign policy. 
 
However, it was soon found that no one was capable of writing such a review. The drafts produced 
lacked the transformational vision that Martin was looking for (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.141). Bill Graham 
decided to find a new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who could inspire a revolutionary defence policy that 
would act as the basis for Martin's desired foreign policy (Stein and Lang, 2007, 143). Rick Hillier was 
such a man. 
 
Known as a "soldier's soldier" (Candour and Combat), Hillier was highly respected within both the 
Canadian and American militaries. He had extensive experience commanding multi-national operations 
(Stein and Lang, 2007, p.101), and had been given command of ISAF in 2004. Hillier was asked by 
Graham to present his vision for the "future of the Canadian Forces and Canada's role in international 
peace and security" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.143). Hillier impressed Graham with "a detailed analysis of 
the international security environment... claim[ing] that the biggest threat to global peace and security... 
would be failed and failing states" such as Afghanistan (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.146-147). 
 
One of the central ideas of previous Canadian missions in other theatres was the "3-Block War." Three-
block warfare consisted of "deliver[ing] humanitarian aid... conduct[ing] stabilization or peace support 
operations.... [and] engag[ing] in... high-intensity fight[s]... simultaneously and very close to one 
another... in large urban centres and complex terrain" (Bratt, 2007, p.244). Hillier argued that in order to 
effectively assist international efforts in failing states like Afghanistan, three-block warfare had to be 
used, and that required "major structural, organizational, and cultural change[s]... [and] a substantial 
increase in the size [and budget] of the military" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.155). Graham believed that 
Hillier could inspire a novel defence policy paper that would in turn inform the IPS with the bold vision 
Martin was looking for. 
 
Martin was also impressed with Hillier and decided to make him the Chief of Defence Staff. Within 
weeks Hillier produced a defence policy paper that won Martin's approval and the promise of billions of 
dollars in funding for the Canadian Forces (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.157). Hillier was set to revolutionize 
Canada's military and "restore [it] to its former glory" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.159), bringing Canada's 
military out of the "decade of darkness" brought on by Liberal budget cuts in the early 1990s ("Top 
General," 2007, p.1). This enthusiastic support for the military would prove instrumental in giving 
Canadian troops an extensive combat-developmental role in Kandahar. 
 
In February 2005, NATO expanded ISAF's mission ("NATO to expand mission," 2005, p.1). Until then, 
ISAF's mandate had been limited to operating in and around Kabul. Because of this the Afghan 
government had little control outside the capital, leaving the rest of the country in poor condition. The 
Taliban—the hardline Islamist militant group which had previously ruled Afghanistan but which had 
been overthrown by the US invasion in 2001—had begun a resurgence along with powerful drug lords. It 
was recognized that if Afghanistan was to ever function normally with order restored and maintained, 
then ISAF's expanded mission would deploy PRTs from NATO countries throughout Afghanistan in an 
attempt to "wrestle... control of the south... from insurgents and criminals" (Windsor, Charters, Wilson, 
2008, p.33). 
 
When Bill Graham announced Canada would deploy a PRT after operations in Kabul were over, the PRT 
was still thought of as an exit strategy. However, it was not yet known to which Afghan province the PRT 
would be sent, even though officials had known since 2003 that the PRT would be part of Canada's exit 
plan (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.133). The US, Germany and Britain had already deployed PRTs in 2003, and 
at this time other NATO countries were scouting out "the best real estate, the safer neighbourhoods of 
Afghanistan" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.133) for their PRTs. 
 
Officials in Foreign Affairs and Defence spent almost a year debating where to send Canada's PRT. Some 
preferred Kabul, where the Canadians were already established; others preferred the relatively stable 
north, and others wanted a western deployment so as to better observe Iran (Stein and Lang, 2007, 
p.133). Italy wanted to work with Canada in Herat, in the north-west, and the commander of NATO 
wanted Canada in Chaghcharan, in Afghanistan's centre (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.135). At this time Ray 
Henault was still CDS, and he rejected the idea of a Canadian PRT in either Herat or Chaghcharan. Both 
provinces would be within "the Italian sphere of influence," and the idea of working with or under the 
Italians was not popular within the Canadian military, since Canada's role might be overshadowed by 
them (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.136). In addition, Chaghcharan offered Canada "inadequate international 
visibility" because it was so isolated (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.136). There were also logistical challenges.  
 
NATO was not interested in Canada sending a PRT to Kandahar. Brian Stewart says that all of NATO 
knew Canada's military was "quite incapable of handling all the security nightmares of Kandahar" 
("Canada in Kandahar," 2011, p.1). However, Henault and other Canadian officials believed Canada was 
up to the task. Many believed that Kandahar would become a pivotal province, so a deployment there 
would put Canada in the international spotlight. The ambassador to Kabul at the time believed that 
putting a PRT in Kandahar would fit with the "robust capabilities of the Canadian Forces... and the 
evolving mission of ISAF" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.133). Britain and Holland would have well-equipped 
and well-trained troops operating in neighbouring provinces, and the Canadian military had experience 
working with these troops (Windsor et al, 2008, p.36). 
 
From the beginning, then, Kandahar was considered a feasible option for Canada's PRT, at least from the 
perspective of Canadian officials. The main reason for this seems to be a desire for international respect 
and recognition of Canada's contribution to Afghanistan. Canada's international influence and respect 
had "risen substantially" since the Kabul tour (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.132), and a Kandahar mission 
would continue this growth of international respect and political sway. The ever-present urge to impress 
the US may have also played a role, as evidenced by Henault and Graham contacting US officials to ask 
where the US wanted Canada's PRT (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.137). 
 
While there were political and logistical reasons for returning to Kandahar, many people believe that 
Rick Hillier was a deciding factor. Hiller was a figurehead who could be used by detractors or supporters 
of the military, since his support for the military was so outspoken and unequivocal. Stein and Lang 
write that "Hillier wanted a deployment that would get Canada deeper and deeper into the most 
troubled part of Afghanistan" (2007, p.181). However, Hillier claims that he had argued for a 
deployment to Kabul. "Nobody in Ottawa was interested," he writes, "so the idea died" (Hillier, 2009, 
p.343). By the time he became CDS, he continues, "[t]he government had already signalled its intent to 
go into Kandahar... and the [various departments] were well into their planning of that mission" (Hillier, 
2009, p.343). According to Windsor et al., the Deputy Director of Policy on the Afghanistan Task Force 
and the Political Director for the Kandahar Reconstruction Team also reject the idea that Hillier "drove 
the Kandahar commitment" (Windsor et al., 2008, p.35). Hillier does say, however, that he supported 
the choice of Kandahar over Herat, calling the latter a "backwater" that would have given Canada "little 
visibility, credibility or impact internationally" (Hillier, 2009, p.343), showing he was also motivated by a 
desire for international respect for Canada.         
          
Hillier does not go into details about the Kandahar decision in his memoir, but he does not seem to be 
the type of person who lets ideas he firmly believes in fade away in the bureaucracy and political offices 
of Ottawa. What he was thinking is not certain. It may be that he dutifully suggested a Kabul mission, 
one that would be safe for Canadian troops and would fit with the public's expectation of the military, 
but when he found that the political environment was leaning towards Kandahar he enthusiastically 
supported that mission instead. 
 
While Stein and Lang may have erred in attributing the choice of Kandahar to Hillier, they seem to be 
correct in claiming that he was responsible for greatly expanding the role of the PRT. After being CDS for 
only a month, Hillier had already devised a plan that "went far beyond deploying a single PRT [in 
Kandahar] as an exit strategy from Kabul" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.181). He understood better than the 
politicians that a PRT alone would have little impact in Kandahar (Hillier, 2009, p.343). His plan consisted 
of five elements (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.182). The first was the deployment of a PRT to Kandahar in the 
late summer of 2005, for two to three years. He then argued for the deployment of JTF2 special forces 
to the same region. Next, he proposed that Canada send a battle group of up to 1000 soldiers to work 
first with US troops under Operation Enduring Freedom, and then under NATO's mandate when the US 
scaled back its presence. Fourth, Hillier wanted Canada to send 350 soldiers and a one-star general to 
take command of the ISAF Regional Command South headquarters in Kandahar. Finally, Hillier wanted a 
fifteen-person team sent to Kabul to assist the Afghan government and gain valuable information and 
influence.  
 
When Hillier presented this plan to Martin in March 2005, Afghanistan was not one of the prime 
minister's priorities (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.189). Martin was interested in exploring a traditional 
"Canadian" peacekeeping role in Darfur, something which would easily gain public support. Assisting 
international efforts in Haiti was next on his list, followed by peacekeeping opportunities in the Middle 
East. While Martin would have had the PRT play a minimalistic role in Afghanistan, Hillier presented 
powerful arguments in favour of giving the PRT a much broader mandate and extensive capabilities. 
 
First, such an involved role would gain Canada much-needed favour in US eyes. Although Canada-US 
relations were a priority of the Martin government, the relationship between the two countries had 
become somewhat strained due to repeated Canadian refusals of American requests. There was still 
lingering tension in the Pentagon from Chretien's decision to refuse to support the Iraq war, and Martin 
had refused to send Canadian troops to Iraq to participate in a NATO mission to train the Iraqi army 
(Stein and Lang, 2007, p.167). Canada had also declined to join the Ballistic Missile Defence program. As 
the US was scaling back operations in Afghanistan in order to focus more on Iraq, it needed allied troops 
to help sustain its mission in Afghanistan. Canadian officials believed that another major contribution to 
Afghanistan would make up for lapses in US-Canada relations and win US approval and gratitude. 
 
Hillier argued that such a major contribution would win Canada the respect of "[n]ot only the [US], but 
also the United Kingdom, NATO, the UN, and the Afghan government" (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.184). 
Canada's foreign and defence policy would be boldly transformed, thus distinguishing Martin from his 
predecessor and making a Canadian mark on the world. Thanks to the raised profile of its military, 
"Canada would no longer be on the margins" of international politics (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.184-185). 
Indeed, the Canada Research Chair in International Security and Ethnic Conflict later wrote, "Canada has 
gained a great deal of influence because of its willingness to lead... in Kandahar. While it does not see 
itself as a power-seeking country, having more influence, whether it is over operations in Afghanistan or 
in bilateral discussions with the United States, is a significant and undervalued benefit" (Saidemen, 
2009, p.1). 
 
It is clear that Hillier's enthusiastic support of the Canadian Forces motivated him to propose such a 
major contribution to Afghanistan. First, as a responsible general he would not let a PRT deploy to 
Kandahar without adequate protection. But the plan he proposed went beyond simply protecting the 
PRT. It involved a far more committed, multi-dimensional force that would fight a three-block war. This 
is what was needed to have any significant impact, and it neatly coincided with Hillier's defence policy. 
An extensive Kandahar mission provided Hillier the opportunity to put his defence policy into action, 
changing the PRT from a mission designed as an exit strategy that would likely have little impact, to one 
aimed at making lasting contributions to Afghanistan. Doing so would bring the Canadian Forces out of 
the "decade of darkness" caused by Liberal defence cuts by raising the profile, budget and moral of the 
Canadian Forces ("Top General," 2007, p.1). Hillier also believed the military would earn public support 
and pride for taking on such a difficult but important mission (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.185). 
 
Martin did not share Hillier's view that the public would support an extensive combative role (Stein and 
Lang, 2007, p.191). He believed Canadians would offer more support for peacekeeping roles in places 
like Darfur and Haiti. He also thought that actively pursuing such operations would better distinguish 
him from the preceding government than would missions in Afghanistan that were holdovers from 
Chretien's era (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.192). However, Hillier was still able to convince Martin to support 
his Kandahar package. After being assured that, among other things, the mission would not constrain 
the military's capacity to provide troops for both Darfur and Haiti, Martin agreed to look into Hillier's 
proposal (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.191). 
 
In May 2005, Hillier's Kandahar package was accepted by the Cabinet, launching Canada into a mission 
that was far more complicated and dangerous than anyone had contemplated. Hillier's contribution to 
the mission likely better prepared Canadian troops for what they would encounter. It was first billed as 
anything but a war: it was a mission aimed at rebuilding Afghanistan, "a clear expression of Canadian 
values at work," according to Martin's chief of staff Tim Murphy (Stein and Lang, 2007, p.199). However, 
it soon became clear that the traditional role of Canada's military was being radically changed from one 
of peacekeeping boy-scouts to all-out warriors (Bratt, 2007, p.247). 
 
The job of warriors, and the Canadian Forces, is to be able to kill people—at least, according to Rick 
Hillier. Now, over ten years after the initial invasion, the role of Canada's military in Afghanistan has 
shrunk substantially, and Hillier's bold statement does not seem to ring as true as he may wish. Those 
Canadian soldiers remaining in Afghanistan are either training Afghan soldiers and police, or providing 
protection for those in charge of training. While Canada's military may not have been revolutionized to 
the extent Hillier wanted, its soldiers have certainly gained renewed support from the government and 
public, and the experience in Afghanistan—from Kandahar to Kabul, and back to Kandahar—has brought 
forth many lessons for both policy makers and military leaders. 
 
The public has often questioned Canada's Afghanistan mission, and there are many factors which 
explain its development. Canada was first drawn into Kabul by its political obligation to support the US. 
The PRT was originally intended as part of Canada's exit plan, with Kandahar as the preferred choice for 
its placement because of the international prestige it would bring. Finally, Hillier believed the Canadian 
Forces could and should play a significant role in international affairs, and that if the Forces were to have 
any impact in Afghanistan, the PRT should be given a more extensive role, rather than be seen as an exit 
plan. Hillier saw Kandahar as the perfect place to display Canada's revitalized military and new, more 
aggressive defence policy. His support of the military and belief in its importance were instrumental in 
committing the PRT to a more extensive, combative role that would eventually lead to Canada's long-
term engagement in Afghanistan. 
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